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I. INTRODUCTION: PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH LACK
OF ACCESS TO CLEAN WATER
Clean, safe water is a basic necessity. Water is needed not only for
drinking but also for agriculture to provide food and basic hygiene,
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supporting health and preventing disease.' Estimates suggest that
excluding water for agriculture, industry, or energy production, a person
needs at least 100-200 liters of water per day to satisfy basic survival and
health needs, which translates into thirty-six to seventy-two cubic meters
of water per year.2 Beyond meeting basic needs, many types of industry
depend on water, so a country's access to water often affects
development.' Yet a substantial portion of the world's population lacks
basic access to clean water and sanitation, which leads to a significant
global burden of disease and death from water-borne diseases Children
are particularly vulnerable to water-borne illnesses, especially poor
children and children in developing countries.6 Still, poor water conditions
affect everyone, as shown by a 2003 UNESCO Report attributing 2.2
million deaths in the year 2000 to a lack of safe drinking water and
sanitation.7 This makes lack of safe drinking water the third highest cause
of death in the developing world (after malnutrition and unsafe sex, both
of which relate to deaths from HIV/AIDS). 8
Public health officials and civil engineers have long been concerned
about ensuring access to clean, safe water, and in recent years, lack of ac-
cess to safe water has gained increasing recognition as a human rights
issue.9 This recognition is based partly on the death and disease that results
1. WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION ASSESSMENT 2000
1-3 (2000) [hereinafter WHO].
2. MICHAEL T. KLARE, RESOURCE WARS: THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL CONFLICT
142 (2002) (citing THE WORLD BANK, A STRATEGY FOR MANAGING WATER IN THE MIDDLE
EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 11 (1994)).
3. Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implica-
tions, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1992).
4. In 2000, the World Health Organization estimated that 1.1 billion people did not have
access to an improved water supply of at least twenty liters per day; eighty percent of those lack-
ing minimum access were rural dwellers. More than twice that number, 2.4 billion, did not have
access to sanitation. See WHO, supra note 1, at 1.
5. In 1997, the UN estimated that 2.3 billion people suffered from diseases linked to
water. See U.N. COMM'N ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF FRESHWATER
RESOURCES OF THE WORLD 39 (1997).
6. WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK GROUP'S PROGRAM FOR WATER SUPPLY AND SANI-
TATION 7 (2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/htmlfpd/water/pdf/WSS-report_Final_
19Feb. pdf; WHO, supra note 1, at 2; see also U.N. EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG.
[UNESCO], WATER FOR PEOPLE, WATER FOR LIFE 11 (2003), available at http://
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001295/129556e.pdf.
7. Alan Hecht, International Efforts to Improve Access to Water and Sanitation in the
Developing World: A Good Start, but More is Needed, ALI-ABA Continuing Legal Educ.,
SK046 ALI-ABA 321, 325 (2005) (Westlaw) (citing UNESCO, supra note 6).
8. Id.
9. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot.
of Human Rights, Final Report of the Special Rapporteur Mr. El Hadji Guissi, Relationship
between the Enjoyment of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Promotion of the Reali-
zation of the Right to Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation, 18, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/20 (July 14, 2004) [hereinafter Guissi Final Report]; ECOSOC, Comm. on
[Vol. 28:469
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from lack of such access, but the human rights perspective highlights other
potential human rights problems that arise from lack of safe water. For
instance, refugees may face challenges in accessing water and sanitation.'0
Similarly, lack of access to safe water in the vicinity of the home has par-
ticular impact on women and children." Many children, especially girls,
spend their days carrying water from distant sources rather than going to
school, which impinges on their right to an education.' 2 Women in some
areas are more vulnerable to sexual assault if no secure sanitation facilities
are available for their use. 3 In short, access to safe water and sanitation are
essential components of a life of dignity.
4
Another dimension of the interrelatedness of human rights and access
to water is that interstate rivalries over water may fuel conflict and vio-
lence, potentially contributing to human rights violations.' Countries must
often share water resources because rivers and aquifers cross political
boundaries. Water disputes have contributed to past wars, such as the
Arab-Israeli War of 1967. '6 In the future, the combination of limited global
supplies of water, population growth, and increasing water demands from
urbanization and industrialization may create or exacerbate interstate con-
flict.' 7 These conditions could promote war, especially in regions where
political relationships are already fragile or where states have already
demonstrated willingness to engage in military conflict over water.
8
Agreements for sharing water resources can help avoid conflict, but as
Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 15 (2002),
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter General Comment 15]; U.N. Gen. As-
sembly, Human Rights Council, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15
March 2006 Entitled "Human Rights Council," U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/L.3 (Oct. 2, 2006). See
generally Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31 EcOL-
oGY L.Q. 957 (2004).
10. WHO, supra note 1, at 35; U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, ENSURING CLEAN
WATER AND SANITATION FOR REFUGEES 1 (2002) ("The common surge in death rates among
refugees in the first days of displacement is largely due to the lack of clean water and proper
sanitation in areas of spontaneous refugee concentration.").
11. WHO, supra note 1, at 35.
12. WORLD BANK, supra note 6, at 7.
13. See Guiss9 Final Report, supra note 9.
14. Id. 17; WHO, supra note 1, at I.
15. KLARE, supra note 2, at 138-142. See generally Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schi-
pani, Ecology and Violence: the Environmental Dimensions of War, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 243
(2004).
16. KLARE, supra note 2, at 139.
17. Id.
18. Some countries in water-scarce regions consider water supplies essential to their con-
tinued national survival, suggesting that threats to water supplies could be considered a justifiable
cause of war. See KLARE, supra note 2, at 139-141 (quoting Moshe Sharret on Israel's view of
water: "Water for Israel is not a luxury. It is not just a desirable and helpful addition to our na-
tional resources. Water is life itself.").
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pressures on water supplies increase, reaching agreements and abiding by
them becomes increasingly difficult.' 9
This Note considers implications for the human fight to water in the
context of the trend toward privatization of water supplies. Part II exam-
ines the legal bases of the right to water, and Part III discusses the
potential obligations that arise from it. Part IV then looks at the interaction
between the fight to water and arrangements to privatize water supplies.
This Note posits that human rights law does not simply support or oppose
privatization of water supplies and services. Rather, bringing a human
rights perspective to the problem of providing water to the world's popula-
tion both clarifies the minimum obligations of governments and private
companies when privatization is pursued and highlights practical difficul-
ties that arise from privatization. The Note concludes in Part V that
viewing the problem of how to ensure access to clean water for the global
population through the lens of human rights clarifies goals and responsi-
bilities and provides a legal framework for action.
II. THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: BASES AND CONTOURS
OF THE RIGHT TO WATER
A. Possible Legal Bases of the Right
Legal scholars and the human rights community have identified and
increasingly recognized a human right to water over the past few dec-
ades.0 The 1999 London Protocol on Water and Health imposes a positive
legal obligation on countries to ensure access to clean water.2' Several hu-
man rights treaties expressly recognize a human fight to water, including
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and
the regional African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. As
stated in CEDAW, the right to water fits under the heading of nondiscrimi-
19. Cf KLARE, supra note 2, at 172, 182 (suggesting interstate agreements on water dis-
tribution as a way of resolving regional conflict over water supplies).
20. Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Tracy Higgins, No Recourse: Transnational
Corporations and the Protection of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Bolivia, 27 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 1663, 1725 (2004). See generally General Comment 15, supra note 9; Bluemel,
supra note 9.
21. ECOSOC, Econ. Comm'n for Eur., Draft Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes,
U.N. Doc. MP.WAT/AC.1/1999/1 (Mar. 24, 1999) (prepared for submission to the Third Ministe-
rial Conference on Environment and Health, June 16-18, 1999), available at http://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G99/309/93/pdf/G9930993.pdf. See also Jennifer Naegele,
What is Wrong with Full-Fledged Water Privatization?, 6 J.L. Soc. CHALLENGES 99, 105 (citing
Guissi Final Report, supra note 9).
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nation against rural women, more particularly under the right to "adequate
living conditions," and is framed as a right to "water supply. '2  The CRC
defines the right as a state obligation to ensure "provision of ... clean
drinking water" and places it in the context of the right to health and the
state's obligation to take steps to "combat disease and malnutrition. 23
Similarly, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child sees
the right to water as relating to provision of nutrition and obligates states
to take measures to "ensure the provision of adequate nutrition and safe
drinking water."
24
Although the right to water does appear in some international legal in-
struments, such a right does not expressly appear in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) or the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).2 5 By their
terms, these two covenants protect the rights of humans in general, regard-
less of characteristics such as age or gender. Since neither of these two
covenants explicitly includes the right to water in the text, if a right to wa-
ter is to be found in either of them, it must be implied from textually
guaranteed rights.26
1. ICCPR
One way to imply a right to water entails inferring it from the right to
life as protected by Article 6(1) of ICCPR, which reads, "Every human
being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life., 27 This approach has intuitive• 21
appeal because water is necessary to life. One difficulty with implying a
22. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 14,
2(h), Sept. 30, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
23. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24, 1, 2(c), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].
24. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. 14(2)(c), July 11, 1990,
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49.
25. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See also Ignacio J. Alvarez,
The Right to Water as a Human Right, in LINKING HUMAN RiGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 71,
72 (Romina Picolotti & Jorge Daniel Taillant eds., 2003) (noting the absence of specific mention
of the right to water in the ICCPR, ICESCR, and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights);
Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a Human Right
and the Duties and Obligations it Creates, 4 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 331, 334, 338 (2005).
But see ALEX CONTE, SCOTT DAVIDSON & RICHARD BURCHILL, DEFINING CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 1 (2004).
26. See McCaffrey, supra note 3, at 7. See also Alvarez, supra note 25, at 72.
27. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 6(1).
28. See McCaffrey, supra note 3, at 5 (quoting an undated brochure by the UN Depart-
ment for the Technological Cooperation for Development of Water Resources stating, "[n]o
resource is more basic than water.").
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right to water from this provision is that the text traditionally has been un-
derstood narrowly to protect the right to life only as a civil right; that is,
the protection extends to arbitrary deprivations of life by the state but does
not require the state to take affirmative action to guard citizens' lives.29
Indeed, the individual cases considered by the Human Rights Committee
(HRC) (one of the former enforcement mechanisms of the ICCPR °) have
often dealt with topics such as state killings and capital punishment.3
However, a broader reading of the right to life under ICCPR is possible.
According to this view, the right to life includes a socioeconomic compo-
nent and demands positive action by states.32 This view finds support in the
HRC's General Comment 6, which states:
The Committee has noted that the right to life has been too often
narrowly interpreted. The expression "inherent right to life" can-
not properly be understood in a restrictive manner, and the
protection of this right requires that States adopt positive meas-
ures. In this connection, the Committee considers that it would be
desirable for States parties to take all possible measures to reduce
infant mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in
adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and epidemics.33
If one accepts this more expansive interpretation of the right to life
under Article 6, then it is also reasonable to see this right as encompassing
a right to water. If states have an obligation to adopt positive measures to
protect the right to life, these obligations should include providing access
to the means of sustaining life. This in turn would necessarily imply an
obligation to ensure some access to clean water, since water is essential to
human life.34 The reference in General Comment 6 to reducing infant mor-
29. Id. at 9 (referring to Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty,
in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 114 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981)). See also Hardberger,
supra note 25, at 332.
30. The United Nations General Assembly replaced the Human Rights Committee with
the Human Rights Council in April 2006. See G.A. Res. 60/251, 1 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251
(Apr. 3, 2006). Although the new Council has already expressed interest in the human right to
water, it is difficult to predict the effect of this change at this early stage.
31. See SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 154-193
(2d ed. 2004).
32. See id. at 184. See also McCaffrey, supra note 3, at 10; Hardberger, supra note 25, at
332.
33. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, General Comment No. 6: The Right to
Life (Art. 6) adopted at the 16th Session (Apr. 30, 1982), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ tbs/
doc.nsf/(Symbol)/84ab9690ccd8 fc7c 12563ed0046fae3.
34. See McCaffrey, supra note 3, at 10-11; Hardberger, supra note 25, at 338; Alvarez,
supra note 25, at 74 (reasoning that in the modem view the ICCPR right to life encompasses the
right to appropriate means of subsistence and a decent standard of living, which includes sanitary
drinking water).
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tality, malnutrition, and epidemics further supports this inference because
lack of access to clean water contributes to such problems."
Two potential advantages arise from implying the human right to wa-
ter under the ICCPR. First, the text of the ICCPR includes a strong
statement of states' obligations to respect the rights delineated in the cove-
nant because ICCPR protections are immediately binding under Article
2(1): "Each State Party ... undertakes to respect and to ensure to all indi-
viduals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.'3 6 Second, ICCPR rights are protected
by an enforcement mechanism that includes a process of international ad-
judication under the First Optional Protocol. If a state has ratified this
Optional Protocol, an individual can bring a complaint before the Human
Rights Committee against that state for violation of ICCPR rights.37
2. ICESCR
Some commentators have inferred the right to water from economic,
social, and cultural rights as an alternative to implying a right to water
from the ICCPR.38 This line of thinking understands the right to water as
implicit in rights guaranteed by the ICESCR, such as the rights to life,
health, food, and an adequate standard of living.39 Consistent with this
view, in 2002 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ESCR Committee) recognized the right to water as a human right in Gen-
eral Comment 15.40 General Comment 15 does not constitute a legally
binding interpretation of the ICESCR and thus does not impose legal obli-
gations on states. Rather, the ESCR Committee's general comments serve
as nonbinding interpretations of the ICESCR that may be used to deter-
mine whether states have met their treaty obligations.
35. See, e.g., WHO, supra note 1, at 2-3; Alvarez, supra note 25, at 71 ("[W]ater short-
ages or contamination can lead to famine, disease, and even death."); Guissi Final Report, supra
note 9, 120.
36. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 2(1).
37. Id. art. 2.
38. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 25, at 73-74 (finding that a right to water could be in-
ferred from ICESCR Article 11(1) on the right to an adequate standard of living, Article 11(2) on
the right to be free from hunger, or Article 12 on the reduction of infant mortality); Bluemel,
supra note 9, at 969-971. But see Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to
Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 462, 491-500
(2004).
39. See Alvarez, supra note 25, at 73-74. See also Bluemel, supra note 9, at 969-971.
40. General Comment 15, supra note 9.
41. Bluemel, supra note 9, at 972.
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General Comment 15 relies on three rationales to support its finding
of a human right to water. 2 First, it argues that the right could be inferred
from other rights protected by the ICESCR. It links the human right to
water to rights protected under Articles 11 and 12 of the ICESCR, particu-
larly rights that "emanate from" and are "indispensable for" the realization
of the right to an adequate standard of living enshrined in Article 11(1).43
The rights specified under Article 11(1) "include[e] adequate food, cloth-
ing and housing," and the word "includ[e]" indicates this list is "not
exhaustive." Thus, General Comment 15 places the right to water within
the category of "guarantees essential for securing an adequate standard of
living, particularly since it is one of the most fundamental conditions for
survival."'5
The second argument used to support the human right to water in
General Comment 15 is that such a right is necessary to protect previously
recognized human rights. General Comment 15 notes that the human right
to water is "indispensable" to, and a "prerequisite" for, the realization of
other human rights.46 Specifically, the text ties the right to water to the
right to the highest attainable standard of health (Article 12(1)) and the
rights to adequate housing and food (Article 1(1)). General Comment 15
also invokes the ideals of the International Bill of Human Rights, stating
that the right to water should be "seen in conjunction with" the rights to
life and human dignity.47 The underlying rationale here mirrors the logic of
inferring the right as described above: without a right to water, the textu-
ally protected rights would be impossible to realize, so that absence of a
right to water renders the text meaningless.
Finally, General Comment 15 refers to prior recognition of the right to
water in a variety of other international legal instruments to support find-
ing such a right under the ICESCR.4 '8 The pertinent text points to human
rights treaties and environmental declarations, among others.49 The inclu-
sion of instruments of international environmental law in this section of
General Comment 15 draws attention to the absence of such instruments
in the two earlier lines of analysis. ° This suggests that principles and texts
42. See generally SALMAN M.A. SALMAN & SIOBHAN MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, THE
HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: LEGAL AND POLICY DIMENSIONS 56-64 (2004).







50. See SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 42, at 57 (noting that some schol-
ars derive a human right to water from a human right to a clean environment, which is implied
from principles of international environmental law).
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of international environmental law, while perhaps not sufficient to estab-
lish a right to water independently, do offer additional support for the
right.
General Comment 15, CEDAW, and CRC seem to agree that the right
to water merits protection because of its connection to other rights,
thereby suggesting that the right to water is instrumental because it offers
a way to protect other rights. However, this suggestion leaves some ambi-
guity around defining the right to water itself because various connected
rights may implicate different state obligations.' For example, less water
is needed to sustain life, which requires the provision of water for drink-
ing, than to prevent water-bome disease, which requires the provision of
water for both drinking and sanitation. Thus, deriving the right to water
from the right to life would lead to lesser state obligations than deriving
the right to water from the right to health.
Similarly, interpreting the right to water under the ICESCR frame-
work suggests a lower level of legal protection than interpreting it under
the ICCPR framework because of the lack of an adjudicative mechanism
under ICESCR.52 This difference has led some commentators to identify
an implicit hierarchy between the two covenants, with the "ICESCR guar-
antees [remaining] normatively and jurisprudentially underdeveloped
compared to the modem-day [ICCPR rights]." 3 At least one commentator
has argued that having an adjudicative process could help protect the right
to water.54 Others contend, however, that international human rights adju-
dication would not promote access to water and sanitation services.55
Under this second view, even if an international human rights body were
to find that a state had breached its human rights obligations by failing to
provide access to an adequate supply of clean water and sanitation, the
51. Bluemel argues that the human right to water has not been fully defined by interna-
tional law or practice, and he questions whether the right to water is an independent right or a
right subordinate to other rights. Bluemel points out that if the right to water is a subordinate
right, the right from which it stems from will shape states' obligations. See Bluemel, supra note
9, at 963. See also Alvarez, supra note 25, at 72.
52. For a brief discussion of these contrasts, see JOSEPH ET AL., supra note 31, at 7; IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 538 (6th ed. 2003). See also
McCaffrey, supra note 3, at 11.
53. JOSEPH ET AL., supra note 31, at 8.
54. See Ramin Pejan, The Right to Water: The Road to Justiciability, 36 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 1181, 1209 (2004) (arguing that states should support the fight to water by adopt-
ing the Draft Optional Protocol to the ICESCR to create an individual complaint mechanism and
create a new rapporteur on the right to water).
55. See generally Dennis & Stewart, supra note 38 (arguing that justiciability for eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights was not true to the intent of the ICESCR's framers and would
not increase compliance). For a more general discussion of how non-adjudicatory mechanisms
may influence state compliance with international law, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Na-
tions Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2645-46 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh,
How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999).
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remedy for such a breach would be difficult to fashion and enforce 6 De-
spite the normative and rhetorical force of these contentions, the
practical difference of justiciability remains and continues to fuel per-
ceptions of hierarchical differences between ICCPR and ICESCR rights.
3. An Independent Right to Water?
Some writers have argued that recognizing water as an independent
human right (for instance, by treaty or customary international law)
would lead to greater- consistency in interpretation of the right, greater
state compliance, better enforcement and protection of the right, and a
clearer understanding of remedies for violations. 7 Recent commentary
has discussed whether an independent human right to water exists-that
is, a right that applies by its own force as opposed to a right
subordinate to other existing rights or treaties." The truth of these
assertions will ultimately depend on the nature and provisions of
the independent right. Currently, only a few countries have recognized an
independent right to water." Further, the right does not appear
to have achieved the status of customary international law, which
would bind states that had not recognized the right.6°
For these reasons, it is difficult to support the assertion that an independent
right to water presently exists.6'
56. Cf. Dennis & Stewart, supra note 38, at 497-98 (noting that often lack of re-
sources underlies a government's failure to provide for basic needs such as water, and
arguing that in such circumstances a finding of a violation can be expected to have "little
effect").
57. See Bluemel, supra note 9, at 968-972 (observing that the International Law
Association encourages respect of a human right to water); Hardberger, supra note 25, at
360-62 (arguing that the right to water should be independently recognized and accorded
customary international law status). See also John Scanlon, Angela Cassar & Nodmi
Nemes, Water as a Human Right? 13-25 (World Conservation Union Envtl. Policy & Law
Paper No. 51, 2004).
58. See, e.g., Bluemel, supra note 9, at 972; Harderberger, supra note 25, at 340.
59. Bluemel, supra note 9, at 977 (noting that some countries, such as South Africa,
India, and Argentina, have provided a legal right to water). See also Pejan, supra note 54, at
1194-1196, 1203-1208 (discussing South Africa's implementation of its constitutional right
to water).
60. See Hardberger, supra note 25, at 345 (arguing that the unclear scope of the right to
water indicates that the right has not "risen to the level of customary international law"). See also
DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 15 (2001) (arguing that while there
may be increasing state recognition of the right, one indication that the right to water is not yet
customary international law is the very problem that makes the right so pressing: many govern-
ments fail to ensure access to all citizens, and because generalized state practice is a necessary
element of customary international law, the failure of state practice impedes the development of
customary international law). But see Peter Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER POL'Y
487, 494 (1999) ("Regional and national conventions and constitutions are also increasingly
making the right to basic resources a part of accepted State practice.").
61. Cf Scanlon et al., supra note 57, at 20 (concluding that a right water exists but has not
been "expressly recognised as a fundamental human right").
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Despite these obstacles, some international documents advocate for
an independent right to water. At best, this seems to give the independent
right the current status of a normative ideal. For example, the Dublin
Statement declared that it is "vital to recognize the basic right of all hu-
man beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an affordable
price. 62 In a report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Special
Rapporteur for Water noted that, "[t]he right to drinking water and sani-
tation is an integral part of officially recognized human rights and may
be considered a basic requirement for the implementation of several
other human rights. 63 In supporting this assertion, the report refers to a
number of international treaties, regional and national laws, and declara-
tions from international conferences, as well as the fact that water is a
substance essential to human life.64 Similarly, the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated that, "the right to
drinking water and sanitation is both a human right in itself and a basic
requirement for the implementation of other rights including food and
health. '65 The OHCHR further expands the right to water by viewing it as
a crucial component of reducing poverty and promoting sustainable de-
velopment.66
This discussion suggests the right to water might come to be seen as
existing on two planes: as an independent right and as a subordinate or
instrumental right. As noted above, the existence and scope of the
independent right to water remains contested. The scope of the
instrumental right to water poses analytical difficulties because it is not
clear how many underlying needs or uses of water have achieved the status
of human rights .6  For example, while a right to food seems firmly
established, the right to development is still evolving.68 In a world of
62. Int'l Conference on Water & the Env't, Jan. 26-31, 1992, The Dublin Statement on
Water and Sustainable Development, princ. 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.15 1/PC/1 12 (Mar. 12, 1992)
[hereinafter Dublin Statement].
63. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Preliminary
Report of the Special Rapporteur Mr. El Hadji Guissi, Relationship between the Enjoyment of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Promotion of the Realization of the Right to
Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation, 32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/10 (June 25, 2002)
[hereinafter Guiss Preliminary Report].
64. See id. IN 20-31.
65. Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Background Paper: Human Rights,
Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development: Health, Food and Water 12 (World Summit
on Sustainable Dev., Johannesburg, S. Afr., Aug. 26-Sept. 4, 2002), available at www.ohchr.org/
english/about/publications/docs/wehab.final.doc.
66. Id.
67. See Bluemel, supra note 9, at 971 (arguing that some of the economic and socio-
cultural rights under ICESCR that support the ight to water are not technically human rights,
thus creating confusion about the force and extent of the right to water).
68. See, e.g., SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 42, at 23. But see David
Marcus, Famine Crimes in International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 245, 248-49 (2003).
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limited water resources, a seemingly limitless number of valuable uses,
and some elasticity in the definition of human rights, the instrumental
approach threatens to expand into ever larger requirements. This has the
potential to dilute the right, or create conflicts between rights to
competing uses, before the most basic parameters of the right have been
realized for all.69 Careful formulation of the right to water, however,
would assign priority to the most critical uses and needs. Indeed,
General Comment 15 has taken this approach.7°
B.'Potential Contours of the Right
1. Interpretations of ICESCR
General Comment 15 gives a fairly detailed account of the contours
of the right to water and offers the broadest discussion of the right by an
international human rights body, in that it considers access for all people.
The human right to water consists of both freedoms and entitlements
under General Comment 15.7' At the most basic level, the right to water
is an entitlement to "sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible
and affordable water for personal and domestic uses. 72 The adequacy of
the water itself includes three elements at minimum: 1) availability;
2) quality; and 3) accessibility.
73
The first dimension requires that a sufficient and continuous supply
of water be available for basic personal and domestic uses, which ex-
pressly include sanitation and hygiene. General Comment 15 also
recognizes that water is needed to fulfill various other rights protected by
ICESCR, such as the right to food and the right to a livelihood. The
right to food is closely linked to water availability, since around seventy
percent of all fresh water taken from rivers, lakes, and aquifers is put to
agricultural use.75 Arguably, the right to water also encompasses having
69. See, e.g., Bluemel, supra note 9, at 975 (raising an example of a potential conflict
under General Comment 15 between protection of traditional access to water and provision of
water to impoverished communities when traditional water sources could be used to provide
water to impoverished communities).
70. General Comment 15, supra note 9, 1 6 ("Priority in the allocation of water must be
given to the right to water for personal and domestic uses. Priority should also be given to the
water resources required to prevent starvation and disease, as well as water required to meet




74. Id. H6, 12.
75. KLARE, supra note 2, at 143.
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1 6
enough water to support at least some food production, as long as such
use does not impinge on the ability to meet other basic needs.77
The second dimension, water quality, necessitates a certain level of
environmental protection. This suggests a need to protect water sources
from pollution and biological, radiological, and chemical threats."
Moreover, the method of fulfilling the right must be sustainable, mean-
ing that it "ensur[es] that the right can be realized for present and future
generations. '' 79 Together these provisions indicate that a level of protec-
tion of aquatic resources underlies the ability to fulfill the right to water.
The third component, accessibility, is itself composed of four dimen-
sions: 1) physical accessibility (water must be within "safe physical
reach" for everyone and available "within or in the immediate vicinity
of' households and other institutions); 2) economic accessibility (water
and water services must be "affordable for all"); 3) nondiscrimination
(water and water services must be accessible to all segments of the popu-
lation without discrimination on any prohibited grounds); ° and
4) information accessibility (the right to access and share information
about water)."
Under General Comment 15, the right to water also entails proce-
dural rights, including a right to information about water issues, a right
to participate in decisions about water, and a right to effective remedies
for violations of the right.82 These procedural rights have profound im-
plications for how decisions should be made about water resources
because they require transparency and participation.83 In other words,
affected individuals have a right to information about how decisions re-
garding water supplies and services are made and a right to participate in
these decisions. However, beyond these procedural rights, General
Comment 15 does not explicitly discuss the right to participate in the
76. General Comment 15, supra note 9, TT 6-7. See also Guiss6 Final Report, supra
note 9, T 10.
77. See WHO, supra note 1.
78. General Comment 15, supra note 9, In 8, 10, 12.
79. Id. I l1.
80. See id. V 13-16.
81. Id. 12.
82. Id. IT 12, 48, 55. See also Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1675
(suggesting that these three procedural rights inhere in economic, social, and cultural rights
more generally); Violeta Petrova, At the Frontiers of the Rush for Blue Gold: Water Privatiza-
tion and the Human Right to Water, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 577, 596 (2006).
83. These rights would imply that if a government wishes to privatize water resources,
it must satisfy certain procedural obligations, including a right to public participation, com-
ment, and information. See Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1781.
Winter 2007]
Michigan Journal of International Law
management of water resources, nor does it address any duties that
might be borne by individuals enjoying the right."
2. Interpretations of CRC and CEDAW
Another source of information about the scope of the right to water
is the implementation of this right under CRC and CEDAW, two global
treaties expressly recognizing a right to water for children and women,
respectively. As part of implementation, both treaties require state parties
to report periodically on their progress toward meeting treaty obligations
to designated monitoring bodies."5 The monitoring bodies respond to
country reports with concluding observations. Although the primary pur-
pose of the reporting process is to encourage or facilitate state
compliance with treaty obligations, the reports also elucidate the content
of human rights provisions.88 In this way, the concluding observations are
similar to a body of jurisprudence in that they interpret a treaty and clar-
ify the nature of state obligations.
The CRC's treaty monitoring body, the Committee on the Rights of
the Child (the CRC Committee), has frequently mentioned the right to
water, framing it in both the context of health and an adequate standard
of living. The treaty text refers to the state obligation to ensure "provi-
sion of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking water." 7 However,
in interpreting this right, the CRC Committee has emphasized "access"
to water. For example, in recent concluding observations for Uganda, the
CRC Committee noted its concern that "increasingly large numbers of
children ... do not enjoy the right to an adequate standard of living, in-
cluding access to food, clean drinking water, adequate housing and
latrines."8 The CRC Committee recommended that Uganda "reinforce
its efforts to provide support and material assistance, with a particular
84. SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 42, at 74-75 (noting Jan
Lundqvist's argument that public participation should be allowed and supposed to ensure that
fundamental human rights to water and sanitation are met); Jan Lundqvist, Rules and Roles in
Water Policy and Management-Need for Clarification of Rights and Obligations, 25 WATER
INT'L 194 (2000). A participatory approach is also endorsed in the Dublin Statement, supra
note 62, princ. 2.
85. See CRC, supra note 23, art. 44; CEDAW, supra note 22, art. 18.
86. MICHAEL O'FLAHERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UN: PRACTICE BEFORE THE
TREATY BODIES 1-2 (2d ed. 2002). Cf Jane Connors, An Analysis and Evaluation of the Sys-
tem of State Reporting, in THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3, 6 (Anne
F. Bayefsky ed., 2000).
87. CRC, supra note 23, art. 24, 1 2(c).
88. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Comm. on the Rights of the Child
[CRC Comm.], Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child:
Uganda, T 57, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/UGA/CO/2 (Nov. 23, 2005).
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focus on the most marginalized and disadvantaged families, and to guar-
antee the right of children to an adequate standard of living."'89
Similarly, the CRC Committee's recent country report indicated that
lack of access to water posed problems in attaining an adequate standard
of living in Peru.9° Concern focused particularly on the disparity of ac-
cess to water between rural and urban areas, as only thirty-four percent
of rural families had access to water, compared to seventy-four percent
for urban areas.9' The CRC Committee also expressed concern about
"environmental health problems arising from a lack of access to safe
drinking water, inadequate sanitation and contamination by extractive
industries," and it recommended an increased effort by the state to pro-
vide "sanitation and safe drinking water to all the population. 92
In contrast, the CRC Committee's concerns about unavailability of
water in Ghana arose in the context of infant mortality. The recommen-
dation was to allocate more financial resources to providing safe water,
sanitation, and health services.93 Similarly, General Comment 7 to CRC
places access to water under states' obligations to ensure access to health
care and nutrition in order to improve early childhood health and reduce
infant mortality.
94
Several principles emerge from the commentary by the CRC Com-
mittee. The right to water relates to a number of other rights, primarily
the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to health, includ-
ing health in early childhood and infancy.95 Some recent concluding
remarks also allude to the specific concept of environmental health.96 The
right to water, as understood by the CRC Committee, clearly encom-
passes sanitation and safe drinking water, but other water uses are not
89. Id. 158.
90. CRC Comm., Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child: Peru, 58, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/PERICO/3 (Mar. 14, 2006) [hereinafter CRC Concluding
Observations Peru].
91. Id.
92. Id. IN 50-51.
93. CRC Comm., Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child: Ghana, In 49-50, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GHA/CO/2 (Mar. 17, 2006) [hereinafter CRC
Concluding Observations Ghana].
94. CRC Comm., General Comment 7: Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood,
27, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/7 (2005) [hereinafter CRC General Comment 7].
95. See, e.g., id.; CRC Comm., Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child: Nicaragua, W] 48-49, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/I 5/Add.265 (Sept. 21, 2005).
96. See CRC Concluding Observations Peru, supra note 90; see also CRC Comm.,
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Thailand, 55-56,
U.N. Doc. CRC/CfTHA/CO/2 (Mar. 17, 2006) [hereinafter CRC Concluding Observations
Thailand] (stating concern "about a range of environmental problems ... which have serious
consequences for children's health and development. While noting improvements in water and
sanitation, particularly for rural families, the Committee is concerned about regional disparities
as regards access to safe drinking water and sanitation.").
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emphasized. Disparity of access to water deeply troubles the CRC
Committee, which focuses on ensuring access to disadvantaged children,
including refugee children and children in rural and remote areas. 97 In
keeping with this focus, the CRC Committee has advocated universal
access.9' Finally, the CRC Committee conceives of state obligations as
embracing a positive duty to act, and thus has recommended expenditure
of money and material resources to ensure access to water and sanita-
tion. 9
One difficulty in interpreting the CRC Committee's remarks is that
the key term "access" has not been clearly defined in concluding obser-
vations.1° In part, the problem arises because the Committee's
observations respond to periodic country reports that also use the term
Saccess" without defining it.'0 ' For example, the CRC Committee seems
to approve of Uganda's efforts to increase rural water supply as a way of
improving access, but neither the Committee nor the periodic country
report details what this improvement entailed.
Unlike the CRC Committee, the treaty monitoring body for CEDAW
(the CEDAW Committee) has not extensively discussed the right to wa-
ter in recent country reports or concluding observations. The right to
water under CEDAW encompasses access to both clean water and sanita-
tion, without defining the term "access." CEDAW also focuses
consideration on rural women, a group vulnerable to deprivations of the
right.'02 However, while the CRC Committee's attention to rural commu-
97. See, e.g., CRC Concluding Observations Peru, supra note 90; CRC Concluding
Observations Thailand, supra note 96. See also CRC Comm., Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Belize, 52, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.252 (Mar. 31,
2005) [hereinafter CRC Concluding Observations Belize]. For remarks on access to water for
refugee children, see CRC Comm., Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights
of the Child: Azerbaijan, 55-56, 59-60, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/AZE/CO/2 (Mar. 17, 2006)
[hereinafter CRC Concluding Observations Azerbaijan] ("[O]ver 40% of the population lack
access to potable water, including the vast majority of refugees.").
98. CRC Concluding Observations Azerbaijan, supra note 97; CRC Concluding Obser-
vations Belize, supra note 97, T 53; CRC Concluding Observations Peru, supra note 90, 59.
99. See CRC General Comment 7, supra note 94; CRC Concluding Observations
Ghana, supra note 93, IT 49-50.
100. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the Special Rapporteur for Water pro-
posed eliminating the term "access" in stating the right and instead using the formulation "the
right to drinking water." See Guissi Preliminary Report, supra note 63, 22.
101. See, e.g., CRC Comm., Second Periodic Report of States Parties: Uganda, 63,
U.N. Doc. CRC/C.65/Add.33 (Nov. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Uganda Second Periodic Report].
102. See U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Comm. on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW Comm.], Con-
cluding Comments of CEDAW Eritrea, [ 26-27, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ERI/CO/3 (Feb. 3,
2006) [hereinafter CEDAW Concluding Comments on Eritrea]. Nearly identical language
appeared in the concluding comments for Mali. See CEDAW Comm., Concluding Comments
of CEDAW: Mali, N 35-36, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MLI/5 (Feb. 3, 2006) [hereinafter CEDAW
Concluding Comments on Mali].
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nities relates to concern with disparities in access and the impact of those
disparities on the overarching goal of universal access, 3 the CEDAW
Committee does not frame access as a universal fight. Instead,
CEDAW's focus on rural women arises from the treaty text rather than
the Committee's independent concern with disparities in access.04
The CEDAW Committee apparently has not addressed state respon-
sibilities on the right to water with the same force as the CRC
Committee. In a recent comment, the CEDAW Committee "urged" the
state to "pay special attention" to ensuring access to clean water.'5 In a
concluding comment for Burkina Faso, the CEDAW Committee recom-
mended that "the access of women to primary health services and
drinking water be facilitated."' '° These statements seem less imperative
more lax than the CRC Committee's firm statements that the state has an
affirmative obligation to ensure access to water and sanitation.
In sum, although some similarities are apparent between the CRC
and CEDAW treaty regimes with regard to interpretations of the right to
water, notable differences can also be discerned. Some variance makes
sense because the textual language supporting the right to water in these
treaties differs. As with General Comment 15, access forms a crucial
factor in determining whether the right to water has been realized under
these treaties, and thus a clearer delineation of the types of access that
satisfy the right to water under CRC and CEDAW is desirable.
III. WHAT OBLIGATIONS DOES A HUMAN
RIGHT TO WATER CREATE?
The traditional view of human rights is that they generate binding
obligations on governments-particularly for states that are parties to the
relevant treaties-and in some circumstances, individuals.'0 7 For the hu-
man right to water, state obligations may arise under a number of human
rights instruments, including CEDAW, CRC, and ICESCR. More re-
cently, the view that human fights law might also bind private
103. See CRC General Comment 7, supra note 94; CRC Concluding Observations
Ghana, supra note 93, V 49-50.
104. See CEDAW, supra note 22.
105. See CEDAW Concluding Comments on Eritrea, supra note 102; CEDAW Conclud-
ing Comments on Mali, supra note 102.
106. See CEDAW Comm., Concluding Comments. of CEDAW Burkina Faso, 276,
U.N. Doc. A/55/38 (Aug. 17, 2000).
107. Cf Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Respon-
sibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 449 (2001).
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corporations has emerged.' °8 This Section discusses the extent of state
obligations and potential corporate obligations.
A. State Obligations
States have the obligation to realize economic, social and cultural
rights progressively under the ICESCR.' °9 However, the ESCR Commit-
tee identified nine core obligations in General Comment 15 that have
"immediate effect.""0 These include ensuring access to a minimum
amount of water for personal and domestic uses, ensuring nondiscrimi-
nation in access to water, adopting water programs designed to protect
vulnerable and marginalized groups, and addressing water-borne dis-
eases, particularly through sanitation programs."' No limitations are
placed on how states must meet these immediate obligations.
More generally, states have three kinds of human rights obligations:
the negative obligation to respect the right (not to violate it), the positive
obligation to protect the right (to prevent third-party violations), and the
obligation to fulfill the right (to ensure the individual's ability to enjoy
it)." 2 Any of these obligations could be implicated in water privatization
arrangements."3 For example, if a privatization contract reassigns water
rights traditionally enjoyed by individuals to a private company, this con-
tract might constitute a prohibited interference in access to water,
thereby violating the duty to respect the right to water.'"4 Privatization
arrangements also affect the state duty to protect the right to water, since
that duty covers states' obligations to protect rights from violations by
third parties, such as private corporations.' The fundamental meaning of
the obligation to protect is that states retain some human rights obliga-
tions regardless of privatization arrangements." 6 General Comment 15
explicitly addresses states' obligations under such circumstances:
108. Id.
109. ICESCR, supra note 25, art. 2(1); General Comment 15, supra note 9, 17-18.
110. General Comment 15, supra note 9, 37.
111. For a full list of core obligations, see id.
112. See id. i 20-29; Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1674-75.
113. I provide a more detailed description of what is meant by "privatization arrange-
ment" in Part IV.
114. See General Comment 15, supra note 9, 21 (discussing the need to respect the
right to water).
115. Id. [23.
116. Id. 24. Cf ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights,
Report of the High Commissioner: Liberalization of Trade in Services and Human Rights,
50, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9 (June 25, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCHR Liberalization
of Trade in Services and Human Rights] ("In human rights terms the need to regulate ... is in
fact a duty to regulate; the obligation on States to 'fulfill' human rights requires States to take
appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, and other measures towards the full
realization of such rights.").
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Where water services ... are operated or controlled by third par-
ties, States parties must prevent them from compromising equal,
affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe and acceptable
water. To prevent such abuses an effective regulatory system
must be established, in conformity with the Covenant and this
General Comment, which includes independent monitoring,
genuine public participation, and imposition of penalties for
non-compliance."'
The significance of this paragraph is twofold. First, the human rights
regime itself contemplates and accounts for the eventuality that water
services may be provided by private companies or other third parties."8
Thus, it is difficult to contend that privatization of water systems and
supplies in itself violates human rights." 9 Second, since state parties re-
tain certain obligations to protect the right to water even under
privatization arrangements, a human rights perspective clarifies states'
responsibilities, elucidates how privatization could potentially violate
rights, and suggests possible steps states should take to mitigate such
impact on human rights.1
2 0
In addition to state obligations, duties to protect human rights also ap-
ply more broadly. General Comment 15 refers to international obligations
to protect the right to water, some of which are particularly relevant to pri-
vatization of water resources and systems in the context of globalization.1
2 '
For example, not only should states avoid infringing on the enjoyment of
the right to water in other states, but they should also prevent their own
citizens and domestic companies from taking such actions. 22 Conceivably,
then, if a company based in one country violates the right to water in an-
other country, the government of the first country has a legal duty to
intervene to prevent future abuses. Further, if resources are available,
states should take actions to "facilitate" the right to water in other coun-
tries (for instance by providing water resources, or technical or financial
aid). 3 The ESCR Committee sees these obligations as extending to trade
117. General Comment 15, supra note 9, 24.
118. Similarly, WHO concludes that the state may privatize water services and user fees
may be charged, provided that everyone can afford essential water. WHO, supra note 1.
119. Cf Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1775 (concluding that the priva-
tization of Cochamba's water system alone was not a human rights violation).
120. Cf. UNHCHR Liberalization of Trade in Services and Human Rights, supra note
116, 50.
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matters and state activities as members of international financial institu-
tions such as the World Bank.'
24
In summary, under a human rights perspective, the right to water is
understood as a fundamental individual right that should be secured by
overlapping layers of state responsibility, which govern state actions
both internally and internationally. In the context of the potential privati-
zation of water supplies and services in a globalized economy, the
significance of such an understanding of the right is that a number of
state and international actors have a duty to respect, protect, and fulfill
the right. Where the right applies, however, responsibility does not fall
solely on the state.
B. Corporate Obligations
Although still in its infancy relative to human rights obligations that
bind states, human rights norms that apply directly to corporations have
received growing interest.' 25 If corporations were found to have a duty to
uphold the human right to water, these duties would provide a second
line of protection for the right to water in the context of privatization. 
26
Some examples of this trend are voluntary, such as corporate codes with
principles by which corporations agree to abide.' 27 The UN's Global
Compact provides an example of such norms.128 While none of the ten
core principles of the Global Compact explicitly protects water supplies
or uses, the Global Compact does state that companies should comply
with international human rights norms, which encompass a right to wa-
ter, as argued above. 29 At least one large water company refers to the
Global Compact in its corporate code of conduct, suggesting some
awareness of the Compact in such businesses. 3 0 But since these obliga-
124. General Comment 15 notes that states should respect the right to water when enter-
ing into international agreements, and it specifically states that trade liberalization agreements
"should not curtail or inhibit" a country's capacity to ensure realization of the right to water.
Id. 35. It also requests that state parties take measures to ensure that the right to water is
"taken into account" by the international financial institutions of which those states are mem-
bers, including the lending policies and credit agreements of the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank. Id. 36.
125. See generally Ratner, supra note 107.
126. See Petrova, supra note 82, at 612-613 (arguing that a human rights approach ame-
liorates the problems associated with privatization).
127. See id. at 603-606.
128. See generally U.N. Global Compact, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
docs/about the.gc/2.0.2.pdf.
129. See id.
130. RWE AG, RWE CORPORATE CODE OF CONDUCT 7-8 (n.d.), http://www.rwe.con/
generator.aspx/property=Data/id=266710/en-download.pdf. RWE is also listed as participant
in the Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/
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tions are voluntary, lack an oversight mechanism, and do not specifically
address the right to water, it seems unlikely that the Global Compact will
play a large role in realizing the human right to water.
3'
The Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Entities with Regard to Human Rights, approved by
the UN's Subcommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights in 2003 (the UN Draft Norms), offer a revolutionary approach
and at first glance seem to provide greater potential for realizing the hu-
man right to water.'32 The UN Draft Norms purport to create binding,
obligatory human rights obligations for transnational corporations and
other business enterprises, stating that "[w]ithin their respective spheres
of activity and influence, transnational corporations and their business
enterprises have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfillment of, re-
spect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in
international as well as national law."'133 The UN Draft Norms strive to
remedy the fact that international human rights law addresses the obliga-
tions and duties of states and international organizations, but often fails
to address transnational corporations.14 The basic rationale for the UN
Draft Norms is that the power transnational corporations enjoy entails
responsibility. International human rights law therefore must "focus ade-
quately on these extremely potent non-state actors."'
35
Given this rationale, the UN Draft Norms could be particularly ger-
mane to protecting the right to water under privatization scenarios. The
UN Draft Norms specifically mandate that transnational corporations
and other business entities "contribute to [the] realization," and "refrain
from actions which obstruct or impede the realization," of certain rights,
including the right to adequate food and drinking water, as well as the
right to the highest attainable standard of health. 36 This suggests that
search.participant.html (enter "RWE" in "Participant Search," then follow "RWE AG" hyper-
link).
131. See Petrova, supra note 82, at 604-605 (summarizing criticisms of the Global
Compact).
132. See generally ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human
Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises With Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26,
2003) [hereinafter UN Draft Norms]. See also ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and
Prot. of Human Rights, Commentary on the Norms on the responsibilities of transnational
corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003); David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Re-
sponsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901 (2003).
133. See UN Draft Norms, supra note 132, art. A, 1.
134. See Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 132, at 901. See also Ratner, supra note 107,
at 461-62.
135. See Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 132, at 901.
136. Id.
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corporations that entered into privatization agreements to provide water
or water services would be required to meet both positive and negative
human rights obligations.'37 At a minimum, they should be required to
ensure that the water was safe enough to protect health and that provi-
sion of water met basic needs for adequate food and water, at least for
some segment of the population.'38 Further, the UN Draft Norms empha-
size that the obligations of companies augment and do not diminish or
replace state responsibilities. 39 Thus, the UN Draft Norms could create a
separate obligation for relevant business entities involved in privatization
of water systems to protect and respect the human right to water, com-
plementing and reinforcing state obligations.'4°
Still, the application of the UN Draft Norms to businesses is limited
in a number of respects. First, the history of the UN Draft Norms subse-
quent to their adoption by the Subcommission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights places their status as law in question. The
Commission on Human Rights, after adoption by the Subcommission,
essentially nullified the Draft Norms by recommending that the Eco-
nomic and Social Council affirm that the Draft Norms "ha[d] no legal
standing."'14' The recommendation appears to relegate the Draft Norms to
voluntary goals or aspirational standards.'4 2 Retreat from the Draft
Norms was not absolute: the Commission recommended that the Eco-
nomic and Social Council "confirm the importance and priority it
accords" to the human rights responsibilities of transnational corpora-
tions and requested a Report from the OHCHR on the "scope and legal
137. Surya Deva, UN's Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?, 10 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
493, 499 (2004).
138. See UN Draft Norms, supra note 132, art. B, 2.
139. Id.; id. art. H, 19.
140. Cf Petrova, supra note 82, at 608 (concluding that the UN Draft Norms could help
ensure that privatization contributes to the realization of the right to water).
141. See ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Respon-
sibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with Regard to
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/116 (Apr. 22, 2004). ECOSOC adopted this recom-
mendation. See ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights,
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with Regard
to Human Rights, T (c), U.N. Doc. E/DEC/2004/279 (July 22, 2004).
142. See Larry Cat Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The
United Nations' Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger
of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 287,
331 (2006) (discussing the history of the UN Draft Norms and arguing that by Spring 2005 it
had become clear that the UN Draft Norms would be abandoned in their current form). But
see Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 132 (arguing that the UN Draft Norms started as soft
law, but would continue to develop a binding nature as they were adopted and promulgated by
other UN bodies; subsequent recognition of the UN Draft Norms would increase in interna-
tional practice).
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status of existing initiatives and standards" on the subject.13 Further, it
noted that the Draft Norms "contain useful elements and ideas for con-
sideration by the Commission."'"
In April 2005, the Commission requested appointment of a Special
Representative with a five-part mandate that included "identify[ing] and
clarify[ing] standards of corporate responsibility and accountability for
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to
human rights," and "elaborat[ing] on the role of States in effectively
regulating and adjudicating the role of transnational corporations and
other business enterprises with regard to human rights, including through
international cooperation."'' 45 John Ruggie was appointed to this posi-
tion, '4 6 and an Interim Report was issued in February 2006 that heavily
criticized the UN Draft Norms and concluded that "the flaws of the
Norms make that effort a distraction from rather than a basis for moving
the Special Representative's mandate forward."'' 4 7 Still, the UN Draft
Norms deserve consideration because they mark a significant, if contro-
versial change in approach to corporate responsibility.4 1 Ideally, the UN
Draft Norms offer the promise of holding private companies responsible
for human rights violations, which could lessen reliance on states as the
primary implementers and enforcers of human rights.
143. See sources cited supra note 141.
144. Id.
145. See ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Human
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, I 1(a), U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2005/L.87 (Apr. 15, 2005). See also ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and
Prot. of Human Rights, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, 68, 1 (a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L. 1 1/Add.7 (Apr. 20, 2005).
146. Thorsten Benner, Opinion, The UN Can Help Business Help Itself: Corporate Re-
sponsibility, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 18, 2005, at 6.
147. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Interim
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 69, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006).
148. Backer, supra note 142, at 288 (contending that the UN Draft Norms retain impor-
tance as indicators of significant changes in thought about corporations and the sources of
corporate regulations, and as evidence of transnational law "coming into its own as a separate
field of power").
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IV. REALIZATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER AND
PRIVATIZATION OF WATER SUPPLIES AND SERVICES
A. Theoretical Perspectives
Provision of water services is often seen as a function of govern-
ments. 49 Justifications for public provision of water include economic,
social, and human rights, along with environmental considerations. 50
Since the 1970s, alternatives have been sought because of problems with
public water systems, including low service quality and coverage, ineffi-
ciency, corruption, low rates of cost recovery, low productivity, and high
debt burden.' As a starting point in comparing public and private sector
systems of water services, it is worth noting that public-sector provision
has failed to ensure universal access to water for the world's popula-
tion.'52 The 1.1 billion people without access to an improved water
supply can, to some extent, be seen as an unfortunate legacy of public-
sector management of water supplies.
Privatization of the water supply is one alternative to public-sector
supply that has been tested in both developed and developing countries,
including France, Britain, Chile, and Argentina. 5' The trend has been
significant enough for at least one author to refer to a "privatization
movement."'54 Although real benefits may accrue from privatization in
certain circumstances, water privatization arrangements have also suf-
fered some high-profile collapses, for example in Atlanta, Georgia, and
Cochabamba, Bolivia. 5 These failures have led to criticism of privatiza-
149. Isabelle Fauconnier, The Privatization of Residential Water Supply and Sanitation
Services: Social Equity Issues in California and International Contexts, 13 BERKELEY PLAN-
NING J. 37, 37-46 (1999); PETER H. GLEICK, GARY WOLFF, ELIZABETH L. CHALECKI &
RACHEL REYES, PAC. INST. FOR STUDIES IN DEV., ENV'T, & SEC., THE NEW ECONOMY OF
WATER: THE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF FRESHWATER
29 (2002).
150. See Jessica Budds & Gordon McGranahan, Are the Debates on Water Privatization
Missing the Point? Experiences from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 15 ENV'T & URBANI-
ZATION 87, 92-98 (2003); Fauconnier, supra note 149 at 42; Jarmo J. Hukka & Tapio S.
Katko, Refuting the Paradigm of Water Services Privatisation, 27 NAT. RESOURCES F. 142, 143
(2003). Cf GLEICK ET AL., supra note 149, at 37-38; MAUDE BARLOW, BLUE GOLD: THE
GLOBAL CRISIS AND COMMODIFICATION OF THE WORLD'S WATER SUPPLY 56-60 (rev. ed.
2001); Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1873,
1894 (2005).
151. Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 87, 97-98; Fauconnier, supra note 149,
at 37.
152. Fauconnier, supra note 149, at 37; Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 97.
153. Fauconnier, supra note 149, at 38; GLEICK ET AL., supra note 149, at 23-24.
154. Fauconnier, supra note 149, at 38.
155. See generally Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20; Douglas Jehl, As Cities
Move to Privatize Water Atlanta Steps Back, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 10, 2003, at A14.
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tion of water services. 6 This Section argues that these failures suggest
strong reasons to approach privatization cautiously, with the purpose of
understanding 1) what contributions privatization may make to the pro-
vision of water and human rights, and 2) how human rights principles
should influence privatization arrangements.
The term "privatization" refers generally to various types of relation-
ships in which assets or operations, or both, move from the public to the
private sector. 1 7 Privatization arrangements differ in terms of how much
ownership or control is transferred to the private sector, what types of
functions the private company performs, and how long the arrangement
lasts.'58 One option is for the asset to remain a public asset, but for a pri-
vate company to manage it for a specified amount of time or to provide
only some of the services associated with running the water system.59
The most extreme transfer of resources to the private sector is "divesti-
ture" or "full fledged privatization," which means an "actual transfer" of
the assets and operations to a private company, but other kinds of "pri-
vate sector participation" exist as well. '6°
It is difficult to generalize about these various kinds of privatization
arrangements, since much of the effect of a given privatization agree-
ment will depend on the context, the specific terms of the agreement,
and its implementation. 6 ' The variables that distinguish these types of
arrangements also tend to have different practical implications for the
human right to water.1 62 As more assets and control shift to the private
corporation, the government progressively loses the ability to provide
156. See generally Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20; Naegele, supra note 21;
BARLOW, supra note 150. Cf. Petrova, supra note 82, at 589-93.
157. Fauconnier, supra note 149, at 43; Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 88-
90; GLEICK ET AL., supra note 149, at 26-28.
158. Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 88-90; Hukka & Katko, supra note 150,
at 143 (distinguishing between core and noncore functions).
159. Generally a "service or management contract" lasts two to five years, a lease lasts
five to fifteen years, and a concession ten to thirty years. See Fauconnier, supra note 149, at
44; Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 88-90. Also possible is a build, operate, and
transfer arrangement, in which a private company builds and runs the facility for a period of
time, allowing for cost recovery and a limited profit. See Fauconnier, supra note 149, at 44;
Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 90.
160. Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 88-90; Fauconnier, supra note 149, at
43-44; Naegele, supra note 21, at 107; JUDITH REES, GLOBAL WATER PARTNERSHIP TECHNI-
CAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REGULATION AND PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN THE WATER AND
SANITATION SECTOR 15-21 (1998). See also Hecht, supra note 7, at 330 (arguing that private
ownership of water systems is quite rare but that contracts for private management of water
systems is more common).
161. Glennon, supra note 150, at 1892. Cf Fauconnier, supra note 149, at 45 ("[T]he
outcomes of privatization may differ according to the political contexts in which they occur.").
162. Glennon, supra note 150, at 1892-93.
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water independently, 63 and the more the government will need to rely on
its regulatory function to ensure that water is provided to the population
and human rights obligations are met. '64
Similarly, longer term arrangements may give governments less
flexibility (and potentially less power) to ensure that standards are met
because the corporation will not be as exposed to competitive pressures
to retain the contract. 65 However, longer term contracts offer a longer
period of time over which to recoup costs, which should be more attrac-
tive to private companies, preserving the incentive to invest in
infrastructure and theoretically reducing drastic rate hikes, since compa-
nies could recoup investments more gradually.'6 Conversely, the
arguments in favor of privatization rest on the presumption that some
level of transfer of control, assets, or function will lead to improvements
in water services. 6 The challenge in any particular privatization ar-t. 168
rangement will be to balance these forces. Human rights challenges
will arise when the privatization arrangement evolves in a way that falls
(either in theory or in practice) to provide adequate safeguards for hu-
man rights.
69
The potential benefits from privatization include: 1) improving effi-
ciency of the water system (for instance, reducing input costs while
adjusting prices to reflect real costs), 2) reducing the financial burden on
163. See Hukka & Katko, supra note 150, at 144 fig. I. Cf. Glennon, supra note 150, at
1893; Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 88-90.
164. See REES, supra note 160, at 6-7. Cf. Glennon, supra note 150, at 1892-93; GLEICK
ET AL., supra note 149, at 29, 35-37; Hukka & Katko, supra note 150, at 144, 153. Cf. Fau-
connier, supra note 149, at 68 (emphasizing the role of regulation in ensuring equity and
protecting consumer interests); Naegele, supra note 21, at 107.
165. See Fauconnier, supra note 149, at 43, 60; REES, supra note 160, at 18 (noting that
"[bly its nature the concession explicitly creates an absolute monopoly and protects the con-
cessionaire from most forms of competition," and questioning the practical ability of
competition during the initial bidding process for concession contracts to inject efficiency into
the system, given the dominance of a small number of companies in the international conces-
sions market).
166. See GLEICK ET AL., supra note 149, at 28; Glennon, supra note 150, at 1893. Cf.
REES, supra note 160, at 21 (arguing that the shorter-term contracts are not designed to help
remedy investment backlogs). But see Fauconnier, supra note 149, at 60-67 (discussing the
countervailing need for private bodies to recoup costs and offering detailed treatment of pric-
ing issues).
167. See, e.g., Petrova, supra note 82, at 587-88; Glennon, supra note 150, at 1892. See
generally Thomas M. Kerr, Supplying Water Infrastructure to Developing Countries via Pri-
vate Sector Project Financing, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 91 (1995).
168. Cf Hukka & Katko, supra note 150, at 153 (concluding that public-private partner-
ships should be implemented in ways that fully utilize the strengths of all stakeholders).
169. Cf Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 88 ("Much depends on the way priva-
tization is developed and the local context."); GLEICK ET AL., supra note 149, at 29-40
(detailing the risks of privatization, several of which threaten the human right to water, such as
the risks that underserved communities will be bypassed, that water quality will decrease, and
that public participation will be precluded).
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the state, 3) allowing the state to focus limited resources on services that
are not as amenable to privatization, 4) developing a market economy,
and 5) attracting capital and international investment. 70 Raising capital
plays a key role in increasing access to safe water for unserved and un-
derserved communities, since it requires significant capital to develop
the infrastructure to treat and deliver water."' In 2000, a widely cited
report by the World Water Council and the Global Water Partnership es-
timated that $180 billion per year would need to be invested in water in
poor countries by 2025 to meet most water needs (a dramatic increase
from the then current investment of seventy-five to eighty billion dollars
per year).'
Additionally, advocates of privatization argue that it may encourage
conservation of water because privatization usually requires incorpora-
tion of the full costs of providing water into the price of water, whereas
governments often provide water free or below CoSt. 73 Some argue that
quality of service improves under privatization, in part because private
companies may be more willing or able to invest in necessary techno-
logical and infrastructure updates.'7 4 Supporters of privatization also
point out that states often have failed to ensure provision of basic ser-
vices.7 7 Thus, ideally, privatization could plausibly support and enhance
the human right to water.
176
No formal contradiction between the human right to water and priva-
tization exists, since human rights documents do not specify the
mechanisms for water delivery. 7 Indeed, General Comment 15 and the
170. Fauconnier, supra note 149, at 44. See also Petrova, supra note 82, at 586-88; Kerr,
supra note 167, at 92-93; Glennon, supra note 150, at 1892.
171. See, e.g., Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 100; REES, supra note 160, at
12.
172. Hecht, supra note 7, at 331 (referring to WORLD WATER COUNCIL, FINANCING WA-
TER FOR ALL: REPORT OF THE WORLD PANEL ON FINANCING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE
(2003)). But see Priceless, ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at 42-43 (noting that according to
WaterAid, a U.K.-based charity, an extra thirty-five billion dollars per year would be enough if
lower cost measures were taken, such as providing standpipes in villages rather than piping
water to each home and not bringing water used for non-drinking purposes up to drinking
water quality standards).
173. A Billion Thirsts Quenched: Water in Poor Countries, ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 2004,
at 42. See also Naegele, supra note 21, at 107.
174. Profit Stream, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 1997, at 70 (defending the steep price increases
in French water bills; at the time, seventy percent of French communes had privatized water
supply systems). See also Kerr, supra note 167, at 102.
175. Hecht, supra note 7, at 330; REES, supra note 160, at 5. See also Petrova, supra
note 82, at 587.
176. Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1776.
177. See id. at 1775-76; Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 95. But see Naegele,
supra note 21, at 114 ("Privatization of water is a violation of human rights 'unless the state
retains control so as to fulfill its obligation to ensure both minimal and progressive access to
needed services on a nondiscriminatory basis.'") (internal citations omitted).
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Special Rapporteur's Report on the Right to Water explicitly recognize
the possibility of privatization, 7 8 and General Comment 15 lays out par-
ticular state obligations that must be met under privatization."9 On a
practical level, however, tensions and challenges persist because the
goals of the right to water do not necessarily align with the goals of pri-
vatization.
80
B. Case Study: Bolivia
1. The "Water Wars"
The collapse of a privatized water system in Cochabamba, Bolivia, is
an often discussed case.'"' Before the privatization agreement, water in
Cochabamba had been provided by a municipal company, SEMAPA. By
1997, SEMAPA only provided water to fifty-seven percent of the
600,000 residents of Cochabamba, and the inefficient system lost around
fifty percent of the water during transport.8 2 Water was rationed, and
those who did not have access to the infrastructure used private wells or
purchased water from private vendors at high cost.
8 3
In 1998, the World Bank pressured the Bolivian government to open
the water system up to the private sector as a condition for guaranteeing
a loan of twenty-five million dollars to improve the system's infrastruc-
ture.' 4 Only one company, Aguas del Tuarni (a transnational company
whose controlling shareholder was a subsidiary of the American com-
pany, Bechtel Enterprises), bid on the call for tender.' The forty-year
agreement gave the company control over the entire municipal water
network, exclusive water rights to all the water in the district, and an an-
nual return on investment of fifteen to seventeen percent (tied to the U.S.
178. See Guissi Preliminary Report, supra note 63, 19 ("The right to drinking water is
the right of every individual to have access to the amount of water required to meet his or her
basic needs. This right covers access by households to drinking water supplies and waste-
water treatment services managed by public or private bodies.") (emphasis added).
179. See General Comment 15, supra note 9, 23, 24, 27 (listing state obligations when
third parties, including corporations, provide water services or control water infrastructure).
Cf. Naegele, supra note 21, at 114-17.
180. Cf GLEICK ET AL., supra note 149, at 29-40 (listing challenges with privatization);
Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 111-13 (arguing that privatization has not signifi-
cantly improved access to water and sanitation for the poor); REES, supra note 160, at 11
("Private companies are not social services.").
181. See generally Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20; Naegele, supra note 21;
Glennon, supra note 150.
182. Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1748.
183. Id.
184. Glennon, supra note 150, at 1890; Naegele, supra note 21, at 124.
185. Naegele, supra note 21, at 124; Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at
1751.
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dollar).8 6 The agreement structured prices based on a system of full-cost
recovery through tariffs for water and services. 7 The government also
required that the company assume SEMAPA's thirty-million-dollar
debt.'88 The agreement required the company 1) to provide water to exist-
ing users, 2) to expand the system as directed by the Superintendent of
Basic Sanitation, and 3) to be "accessible, fair, and efficient" when deal-
ing with users.'89
The company raised water rates by thirty-five percent, and some us-
ers reported increases as high as 200 percent.' 90 This translated into bills
for some workers that amounted to between twenty and twenty-five per-
cent of their monthly income. '9' Beyond the increase in rates, the
community was concerned that plans to meter wells would lead to
charges for water that Aguas del Tuarni had not supplied, thus reducing
alternative modes of access.' 92 Peasant groups in the vicinity of Cocha-
bamba worried that the privatization arrangement did not adequately
protect their customary uses of water, mostly for agriculture. '9'
The situation led to widespread protests and civil unrest-a conflict
sometimes referred to as the "Water War"-resulting in numerous arrests,
some injuries, and at least one death. 94 Eventually the Bolivian govern-
ment cancelled the concession. '9' Following termination, a cooperative
replaced Aguas del Tuarni and Bechtel. The cooperative does not appear
to have sufficient capital to repair or expand the infrastructure, and while
186. Naegele, supra note 21, at 124; Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at
1755-56.
187. Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1756.
188. Id. at 1754-55.
189. Id. at 1756.
190. Id. at 1763; Naegele, supra note 21, at 125.
191. SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 42, at 72 (quoting William Finne-
gan, Letter from Bolivia-Leasing the Rain, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 8, 2002, at 47).
192. Changes in the law after the agreement was made would have permitted the com-
pany to install meters on wells in rural areas that were not built by the company. Naegele,
supra note 21, at 125. The meters had not been installed by the time the unrest began, and the
company asserts that the meters would have been installed at the wells only to charge for sew-
age services. However, this law and the concession agreement would arguably have allowed
the company to charge for the well water or to force people to connect to the company's sys-
tem because the company had "exclusive use" of water sources in the concession area.
Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1766-67. Cf. GLEICK ET AL., supra note 149, at
32 (noting that water collection required permits under this agreement).
193. The specific concerns were that those within the concession area would be forced to
get water from Aguas del Tuarni and that a requirement on individuals to apply for five-year
licenses would impose a significant burden on those outside of the concession area. Sanchez-
Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1768.
194. Compare Glennon, supra note 150, at 1890 (citing seven deaths and the imposition
of martial law), and Naegele, supra note 21, at 125 (citing only one death, but 200 arrests and
121 wounded).
195. Naegele, supra note 21, at 125.
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it may be increasing access slowly for the poor, inadequate service and
corruption continue to plague the system.' 96 Water costs remain as much
as ten times higher for those not on the network or without access to a
well.' 97 Indeed, those without a well or water system in developing coun-
tries often must purchase water from water vendors at high prices, itself
an often exploitive private business relationship for the provision of wa-
ter.
98
2. A Human Rights Analysis
The events in Cochabamba reveal a number of criticisms that can be
leveled against this particular privatization arrangement, many of which
highlight generalized concerns about privatization. Several aspects of the
Cochabamba privatization agreement pose human rights issues: the lack
of affordability of water and equity in pricing; the failure of the state to
ensure that the poorest residents had water; lack of measures to ensure
broad access; potential interference with traditional modes of access to
water by peasants; and procedural problems regarding lack of public in-
formation and participation (the negotiations occurred in secret and over
a short time period).' 99 Although all of these failures are significant, the
first three seem to pose the largest barriers for the progressive realization
of the right to water.
Two constraints on cost apply under General Comment 15: afforda-
bility and equity. The Comment requires that "[a]ny payment for water
services has to be based on the principle of equity, ensuring that these
services, whether publicly or privately provided are affordable for all,
including socially disadvantaged groups. Equity demands that poorer
households should not be disproportionately burdened with water ex-
penses as compared to richer households."2°° Affordability is connected
to the notion that the direct and indirect costs of water "must not com-
promise or threaten the realization of other Covenant rights."20 ' Thus,
equity under General Comment 15 relates to the comparative burden of a
pricing structure on economic classes, while affordability relates to the
price of water in relation to individuals' ability to afford the other neces-
sities of life.202
196. Glennon, supra note 150, at 1891; Naegele, supra note 21, at 126.
197. Naegele, supra note 21, at 126.
198. See GLEICK ET AL., supra note 149, at 32.
199. Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1777-87 (arguing that the violation
of the procedural rights to information and participation may have played a decisive role in
causing the Water War).
200. Id. at 1777 (quoting General Comment 15, supra note 9, 27).
201. General Comment 15, supra note 9,91 12(c)(ii).
202. See Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1777 (explaining that equity is a
"comparative standard" that judges the relative burden on poor and richer households, while
[Vol. 28:469
Privatization and the Human Right to Water
The rate increases in Cochabamba that forced some residents to pay
as much as twenty-five percent of their income for water seemed to vio-
late the principle of affordability, especially since they may have reduced
the ability of the poorest sectors of the population to meet other needs.
The government did not take any specific measures to alleviate the bur-
den of these price increases on the poorest members of society.'O
Instead, the agreement preferred a policy of full-cost recovery and forced
the company to take on SEMAPA's debt, both of which contributed to
the rate increases.'2 The government's position likely was constrained by
the World Bank's requirement that the costs of infrastructure improve-
ment be borne by consumers.0 5 In terms of equity, the government and
company did scale the rate increases based on income so that the in-
creases would be progressive,' °6 but at some levels of water usage, the
price increases were proportionately higher for poorer residents, causing
some critics to find the privatized price structure less equitable than the
preceding one.207
Related to affordability is the requirement that the state protect the
most vulnerable members of society. As General Comment 15 asserts,
"States parties have a special obligation to provide those who do not
have sufficient means with the necessary water and water facilities." 200
The human rights perspective underpinning General Comment 15 does
not tolerate a denial of a minimum water supply based on inability to
pay. Thus, the problem with a full-cost recovery model of privatization
that does not include assurances of water supply for the poorest mem-
bers of society is that under such an agreement the state fails to meet its
obligations to provide "necessary water and water facilities" for those
without the means to procure access. This is particularly troubling when
a government privatizes under pressure from an international agency,
affordability "suggests the right to water sets an upper limit on the cost of water in relation to
people's ability to pay for it"). Compare with Fauconnier, supra note 149, at 41, for a policy-
based, practical interpretation of equity in relation to privatization of water that emphasizes
dimensions of 1) access to services that reliably provide safe drinking water across communi-
ties with different income levels; 2) cost and affordability; and 3) equity in access to
decisionmaking.
203. See Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1778.
204. Id. at 1777-78.
205. Glennon, supra note 150, at 1890.
206. Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1777-78.
207. Id. at 1777.
208. General Comment 15, supra note 9, 15. Interestingly, this right appears to be
linked to, but somewhat distinct from the concept of nondiscrimination under General Com-
ment 15. The full text of paragraph 15 juxtaposes provision of water for the poorest members
of society with nondiscrimination.
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such as the World Bank, to accept an arrangement that entails violationsS • 209
of human rights obligations.
In addition to these failures, the concession agreement did not on its
face provide for increasing access for the half of Cochabamba's popula-
tion without prior access. Rather, it maintained water services for those
who already had them, and it allowed local officials to require that the
company expand access in the future.2 '0 An agreement such as this might
promote broader access over the long term, either at the instigation of the
private company or the government officials charged with oversight. But
making expansion of access contingent on later local, political judg-
ments undercuts one of the primary human rights arguments supporting
privatization: that private companies have the capital to invest in infra-
structure expansion, while cash-strapped governments may not.2 1' If
privatization is to support human rights in this way, privatization agree-
ments must be structured to ensure the investment of capital in updating
infrastructure and expanding access.
Similarly, another common argument for privatization is that private
companies will act more efficiently and effectively than the public sec-
tor,212 but to guarantee a profit of fifteen to seventeen percent in the
privatization agreement risks insulating the company from market forces
that might help increase efficiency.213 Furthermore, the long time period
of the concession and the extensive control over water resources trans-
ferred to the private sector seemed to increase the threat that the public
perceived from the concession. Once conflict arose, the government
could not independently provide for the population's needs, since it had
ceded direct control over the resources by granting the concessionaire
209. Cf Naegele, supra note 21, at 109. Recall that General Comment 15 exhorts inter-
national agencies to respect the right to water as well. General Comment 15, supra note 9,
36.
210. Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1756.
211. See Naegele, supra note 21, at 107 ("Only private capital, mostly from large, trans-
national corporations, can afford to expand water and sanitation systems to reach the
underserved poor."); Glennon, supra note 150, at 1892.
212. Naegele, supra note 21, at 107; Glennon, supra note 150, at 1892; REES, supra note
160, at 5.
213. See REES, supra note 160, at 30 (noting that the presence of a monopoly may erode
efficiency savings that private sector involvement should achieve, unless countermeasures are
taken). But see Hukka & Katko, supra note 150, at 152 (noting that public ownership is usu-
ally not less efficient than private ownership and suggesting that the private sector must offer
additional competence if it is to increase efficiency).
214. See Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1768. This may have been par-
ticularly striking to the population because until shortly before the privatization, people who
owned land had rights to waters that crossed their land, but shortly before the privatization, the
law changed to make all waters in the country the original property of the state. Id. at 1757-
61.
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the exclusive right to provide water services in the area.215 To summarize,
if privatization is to have any chance of advancing human rights, agree-
ments must be structured and implemented in a way that promotes
human rights.
C. Further Challenges of Privatization Arrangements
Commentators have discussed a number of challenges privatization
poses.2 6 Many of the challenges seem to relate to governmental respon-
sibility in monitoring and regulating (where necessary) human rights
conditions throughout the duration of privatization arrangements. One
question in particular is whether governments can or will act in accor-
dance with their duties to protect, respect, and fulfill the right to water.
Critics of privatization argue that governments are often poorly posi-
tioned to exercise such regulatory capacity. Sanchez-Moreno and
Higgins note that governments are often unwilling or unable to exert
their power to prevent or penalize companies for human rights viola-
tions.2 " They further acknowledge that governments are often complicit
in such violations.218
One almost axiomatic answer to the problems of privatization is that
government regulation can and should guarantee that privatization is
implemented in such a way as to satisfy human rights requirements.
Interestingly, both supporters and detractors of privatization seem to




Certainly, governments have the primary duty to make sure that the right
to water is protected and fulfilled.20 General Comment 15 is quite clear
that this responsibility survives the privatization relationship and that the
privatization arrangement actually imposes the duty to regulate and
215. Id. at 1755. It is interesting to note that the government responded to public uproar
by completely revoking the concession and reasserting control over the resources, rather than
attempting to allay public concerns by imposing regulations or more stringent requirements on
the company.
216. See, e.g., GLEICK ET AL., supra note 149, at 29-39; REES, supra note 160, at 8-15;
Petrova, supra note 82, at 589-93; Naegele, supra note 21, at 108.
217. Sanchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 20, at 1668-69.
218. Id.
219. Hecht, supra note 7, at 330 (arguing that good governance supports privatization by
attracting foreign capital and that "it is in countries with strong regulatory frameworks and
sound government institutions that private water companies are best able to provide efficient
management"); Glennon, supra note 150, at 1896 ("For privatization to be successful, gov-
ernments must regulate water as a social good, ensuring access to all."); REES, supra note 160,
at 31 ("The success of privat[ization] will ... critically depend on how well this [regulatory]
task is accomplished."); Fauconnier, supra note 149, at 68 ("[I]t is crucial to recognize the
importance of maintaining some degree of government regulation."); GLEICK ET AL., supra
note 149, at 42; Hukka & Katko, supra note 150, at 153.
220. See General Comment 15, supra note 9, 24; Naegele, supra note 21, at 101.
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oversee water provision on the government involved."' A number of
measures can be used to discharge this responsibility. For example, the
government may subsidize water for the poorest and most vulnerable
consumers, or it may require a tariff structure that makes the amount of
water needed to meet basic needs available free of charge or at very low
cost.
22 2
There may be good reason to react with skepticism to broad-brush
assertions of governments' ability to regulate and protect citizens against
violations of their rights caused by privatization. But if a government is
not in a position to protect the right to water through regulation of pri-
vate industry, it seems unlikely that the government would be in a
position to meet the right itself. Although government oversight and pub-
lic provision of services are different competencies, government
oversight should be less resource intensive and no more subject to prob-
lems of poor governance or lack of resources than provision of public
223services. This suggests that if a government fails to fulfill the right to
water via the public sector, there is little reason to believe privatization
will be better from a human rights perspective, since privatization relies
on governmental oversight to ensure the protection of rights.2  In short,
the dilemma is that governments that may be most tempted by privatiza-
tion may also be those with poorly functioning regulatory systems,
which strongly suggests that privatization will not be a universal solution
for problems in implementing the human right to water. 5
Another practical problem with privatization is that if the right to
water takes on the broad form suggested in General Comment 15, it is
221. General Comment 15, supra note 9, 24.
222. Durban, South Africa, for example, provides six kiloliters of water per month free
of charge and only charges for water use above that amount. Chile issues vouchers that can be
used to pay water bills to those below the poverty line. See SALMAN & MCINERNEY-
LANKFORD, supra note 42, at 71-72. See also Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 109
(discussing subsidies).
223. See Fauconnier, supra note 149, at 44. One caveat is that corruption may be more
pronounced under privatization since more money may be available for corrupt purposes. See
Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 112 (suggesting privatization may create new forms
of corruption).
224. An alternate argument suggests that at least some users, such as the wealthy or the
middle class, may actually have better service and better protections under a privatized ar-
rangement than under a poorly run public-sector system, because they can pay for better
service (giving companies an incentive to provide it to them). But this does not answer the
more pressing human rights question of how to ensure service to those who cannot pay.
225. Naegele asserts that governments "facing the most severe privatization crises are
struggling with internal corruption, limited resources and poor management-and are not
performing satisfactory regulation." Naegele, supra note 21, at 102. Glennon argues that "[iun
the Third World, privatization makes the most sense in those places where the government has
failed to provide basic human needs for their people. But in those countries with weak, inef-
fective, or corrupt governments, privatization presents a problem because governments may
not adequately regulate the private sector." Glennon, supra note 150, at 1893.
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very unlikely that establishing a private supply of water will completely
fulfill the right, because the right extends beyond the scope of privatiza-
tion.2 6 Privatization of water services usually aims at the provision of
water and perhaps sanitation services to communities. According to
227some formulations of the right to water, such services may sufficer.
However, under the broad formulation in General Comment 15, fulfilling
the right to water may include potentially complicated and contentious
tasks such as guarding water supplies against pollution or dividing
scarce water supplies among competing uses. Such tasks, even for a
company with significant control over the water resources and an ade-
quate commitment to human rights, may be daunting and likely exceed
the scope of the private company's power.
A final problem with privatization is that it seems unlikely that priva-
tization arrangements can reach those in the most urgent need of water
supplies: the rural poor in isolated areas. 8 Since rural projects are less
likely to show a profit, they have never been attractive to large, transna-
tional private water providers.22 1 If, indeed, eighty percent of those
without access to water are rural dwellers, large-scale privatization is
unlikely to make significant progress in ensuring access to all. 230 In some
contexts, then, the basic motivations behind privatization are at odds
with a human fights perspective.23 At bottom, privatization arrangements
have the purpose of providing profit to the private enterprise involved.232
The major transnational corporations involved in privatized water supply
in poor countries have recently been retreating from these commitments
because of the risks involved (currency devaluation, high levels of debt,
bad publicity) and because the expected profits have not materialized or
justified the risks.233 However, experiments with small scale privatization
projects under local control may offer viable models for provision of
water services.3  Methods to treat or purify water at the point of use also
226. See REES, supra note 160, at 14.
227. Recall that CEDAW seems to require only a water supply.
228. Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 88, 109.
229. How Not to Help Those in Need: Third-World Water and the Private Sector,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 2004, at 11.
230. See WHO, supra note 1, at 1. See supra text accompanying note 4.
231. Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 109 (noting the lack of profit to support
extension of private sector water infrastructure into poor areas).
232. REES, supra note 160, at 11.
233. The Flood Dries Up: International Water Companies, ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 2004,
at 57.
234. A Billion Thirsts Quenched, supra note 173 (noting the example of Mabuia, Angola,
where poor residents pay a small amount for water and a communal shower, and wealthy
residents pay more and get a tap in their home; the fees pay for a local engineer in the village).
See also Budds & McGranahan, supra note 150, at 109-110 (considering ways to make priva-
tization "pro-poor").
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hold promise, although many issues remain to be addressed. 5 In sum,
creative private-sector initiatives may play a role in realizing the right to
water in the future.
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT ROLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS?
Some commentators seem to suggest that human rights questions are
secondary to the issues of water supply and provision. This raises the
question of what role human rights discourse should play in the ongoing
debate about how best to meet the water needs of a growing and thirsty
global population.
While the right to water is a human rights problem that cannot be
solved through human rights law and human rights activism alone, hu-
man rights play an important role. On one hand, a human rights
perspective emphasizes the normative and moral urgency of the task.
Using the rhetoric of human rights emphasizes the importance of the
final goal of providing safe water to all. On the other hand, human rights
discourse should define the goals and legal requirements of the right and
the responsibilities of relevant stakeholders. In defining the goals and
requirements of the right, human rights discourse should illuminate what
measures are necessary in what time frame, how to prioritize between
competing water uses and competing uses of public resources, and how
the right to water relates to other rights.
Significant work to articulate the human right to water has already
been completed, for example through General Comment 15, but many
questions and practical matters remain unresolved. The status, scope,
and content of the right to water have not been fully detailed. Clarifying
and further developing the theoretical understanding of the right to water
can help stakeholders assess options for progressively realizing the right.
235. Hecht notes the results of a UNESCO Report finding that providing a means of
disinfecting water at the point of use was the most cost-effective approach to reducing water-
borne disease. Hecht, supra note 7, at 325-26. See Eric Mintz et al., Not Just a Drop in the
Bucket: Expanding Access to Point-of-Use Water Treatment Systems, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1565, 1566-67 (2001) (reviewing various point-of-use disinfection methods); John A. Crump
et al., Household Based Treatment of Drinking Water with Flocculant-Disinfectant for Pre-
venting Diarrhoea in Areas with Turbid Source Water in Rural Western Kenya: Cluster
Randomised Controlled Trial, 331 BRIT. MED. J. 478, 478 (2005). My point is not to endorse
any of these as the ultimate solution to the problem of lack of access to safe water around the
world. Rather, my purpose is to recognize the scope of potential options to improve water
safety available in the private sector.
236. Hecht, supra note 7, at 329-331. See also Glennon, supra note 150, at 1896 (ad-
dressing privatization in the U.S. domestic context: "recognizing a human right to water does
not resolve the issue of privatization; indeed it begs the question .... The real issue confront-
ing the United States is not whether to recognize a human right to water, it is how to allocate
the remaining 99% that we use each day.").
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Further explication of the right to water with regard to privatization
could help ensure that privatization arrangements take necessary precau-
tions to protect the right to water and help decisionmakers use human
rights to contain the risks of privatization.
